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Advisor: Professor Peter Liberman 
This paper will explore the similar and different characteristics between Colombian 
female combatants who are members of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Colombia 
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), and the Chechen female suicide bombers who 
joined the Chechen insurgency movement. It shall provide a brief historical background of how 
the FARC, a leftist guerrilla group, and the Chechen insurgency movement ascended into 
prominence during civil conflicts in Colombia and Chechnya respectively. It will discuss how 
many women in both countries would pursue a different form of activism and defy patriarchal 
norms by engaging in acts of violence in the name of their insurgent groups as a way to improve 
the political situation and establish social justice within their states.  
This paper will investigate the similarities and differences regarding the FARC guerrilla 
group recruitment of female combatants and the Chechen insurgent group recruitment of female 
suicide bombers. It will also analyze the motivations that prompted Colombian women to join 
FARC and Chechen women to become suicide bombers. The main argument that I seek to 
present and prove throughout my thesis is that despite having proved themselves as influential 
participants within non-state actors, later on classified as terrorist groups, both FARC female 
fighters and Black Widows remain as invisible perpetrators. Therefore, both FARC and the 
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Chechen insurgent groups have failed to accomplish and set egalitarian standards to improve the 



















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT IV 
I. EMERGENCE OF COLOMBIAN AND CHECHEN INSURGENCY 2 
A. THE NASCENT OF FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS DE 
COLOMBIA (FARC) 2 
B. THE NASCENT OF CHECHNYA’S INSURGENCY 7 
C. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COLOMBIAN AND CHECHEN 
INSURGENCIES 12 
II. BENEFITS OF FEMALE RECRUITMENT & MOTIVATIONS WITHIN 
COLOMBIAN AND CHECHEN INSURGENCIES 14 
A. FEMALE RECRUITMENT & MOTIVES FOR FARC INSURGENCY 14 
RISE AND BENEFITS OF FEMALE TERRORISM FOR FARC INSURGENCY 14 
IMPROVING GENDER EQUALITY 17 
LIMITED OPPORTUNITIES 21 
VICTIMS OF FAMILY ABUSE 23 
POSITIVE ROLE MODELS 25 
COLOMBIAN STATE TROOPS AND PARAMILITARY FORCES – PERPETRATORS 
OF VIOLENCE 26 
COERCIVE MEASURES – PAYMENT AND ABUSE 28 
B. FEMALE RECRUITMENT & MOTIVES FOR CHECHEN INSURGENCY 30 
vii 
 
RISE AND BENEFITS OF FEMALE TERRORISM FOR CHECHEN INSURGENCY 30 
ROLE OF RELIGION 33 
REVENGE 35 
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT – VICTIMS OF RAPE, ISOLATION, AND TRAUMA 39 
COERCIVE MEASURES – BRAINWASHING AND ZOMBIFICATION 42 
ROLE OF NATIONALISM 45 
IMPROVING GENDER ROLE 46 
C. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FEMALE PERSPECTIVES FOR JOINING 
COLOMBIAN AND CHECHEN INSURGENCIES 47 















One of the most perplexing instances that have challenged the status quo within civil 
conflicts is the presence of female fighters carrying out violent actions on behalf of insurgencies. 
Insurgencies are also known as non-state actors, entities that seek to challenge and overthrow 
oppressive state actors. The insurgent groups that will be presented in this thesis are the Chechen 
nationalist movement and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. Section 1 will 
investigate the emergence of the insurgency within Colombia and Chechnya. It will first focus on 
the origins of the FARC and then it will transition to the origins of the Chechen separatist 
movement. Its purpose is to reveal the popularity of these non-state actors in gaining many 
female supporters. It also criticizes the lack of interest of Russian and Colombian state actors in 
halting their own actions that cause deleterious consequences on the Chechen and Colombian 
population. Moreover, it shall also highlight the similarities and differences that both 
insurgencies exhibit involving the inadequacy of state actors in mitigating gender roles for 
females. 
The specific factions in this paper are the Black Widows in Chechnya and the FARC 
guerrilleras (female guerrillas) in Colombia. Section 2 will examine the benefits of recruiting 
women within the insurgent movements of Colombia and Chechnya. In addition, it will explore 
the main motivations that caused women to participate in these insurgent movements. First, it 
will first address the FARC insurgency motives for having female guerrilleras as part of their 
agenda and the beneficial outcomes they hoped it would bring to the FARC in aims to gain a 
positive image within Colombia. It will then discuss the perspectives of Colombian guerrilleras 
as to what reasons compelled them to join FARC. Thereafter, this paper will switch its attention 
to the Chechen insurgency during the Second Chechen War and the reasons insurgents went out 
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of their way to recruit women to become suicide bombers in attempts to gain national liberation 
for Chechnya from the grip of Russia. It will examine the perspectives of Chechen women as to 
why they decided to commit themselves to suicide bombing missions. The purpose of this 
section is to show how engrossed both insurgent movements were in accomplishing the rise of 
their own domestic agendas yet failed to accommodate for the rise of their female members.  
The reason for selecting the Black Widows and FARC guerrilleras is to point out the striking 
similarities between them as female insurgents. The main argument of this paper is that despite 
the fact that both insurgencies in Chechnya and Colombia sought to achieve national reform, 
their female members did not get to experience such reforms in regards to gender roles. The 
purpose of this comparative analysis is to point out the insurgent movements flaws in the sense 
that they treated women’s rights as inconsequential, verifying that females mostly remain 
invisible to both state and non-state actors within Chechnya and Colombia. 
I. Emergence of Colombian and Chechen insurgency 
a. The Nascent of Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) 
The origins of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia stemmed from the lack of 
recognition by representatives of Colombia’s government and their failure to meet the demands 
of their constituencies. Colombia was going through a tumultuous civil conflict known as La 
Violencia (1948 – 1958), where both the Liberal and Conservative political parties were vying 
for majority control of the Colombian government.
1
 This issue would finally be resolved in 1958 
when both parties created an agreement to share power, but did not consider sharing that political 
                                                          
1
 Shana Tabak, “False Dichotomies Of Transitional Justice: Gender, Conflict And Combatants In Colombia.” 
International Law and Politics 44, no.103 (2011): 130. 
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power with left-wing communist groups.
2
 These two political parties failed to include a minority 
political faction in having a role to represent other constituencies within Colombian state affairs. 
The opportunity of becoming an effective state actor was never provided to the communist 
groups. This would set off the perfect environment for an insurgent movement to emerge. Two 
prominent leaders named Manuel Marulanda and Jacobo Arenas would help in organizing and 
leading the new guerrilla branch called the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia.
3
 
Most of the FARC leaders came from a peasant class background, proclaiming their stance 
against state repression and promoting communism within rural areas of Colombia.
4
 Forming a 
non-state actor group provided a good chance for Colombians of the peasantry class to determine 
the best domestic policies for their country. 
The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia were able to gain a strong hold within 
the country due to the terrible social circumstances that many Colombians endured. The ruling 
elites failed to enact measures to remediate the political, social, and economic structures that 
marginalized Colombians of lower socioeconomic status.
5
 After La Violencia period, the 
Colombian government would collaborate with corporations who were granted land rights 
throughout the 1970s – this would cause many peasants to lose their livelihood and become 
displaced.
6
 Being ignored by the Colombian government and other politicians would serve 
beneficial to the insurgent uprising. Many displaced Colombians would seek sanctuary in jungle 
areas, where FARC began to set up its support base and promote itself as an alternative for 
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5
 Ibid, 2. 
6
 Alexandra Welsh, “Women of the Jungle: Guerrilleras on the Front Lines of FARC-EP.” Glendon Journal of 





 Colombia has been plagued with violence, instability, and conflict.
8
 
Colombian society and economy suffer because of this, thus prompting many to seek other 
measures of protection considered safe.
9
 Whereas Colombian state actors were enforcers of 
Colombia’s troubles, FARC insurgency presented itself as the solution to solve them. 
The objectives of the FARC were to reach out to the majority of Colombia’s oppressed and 
poor population in order to represent their interests and gain support. FARC did this by creating 
goals such as implementing political reform, eradicating government corruption, expanding rural 
social programs, and limiting Colombia’s military and defense budget.
10
 FARC also sought to 
implement equal agricultural reform for individuals and proper local autonomy.
11
 The message 
that FARC promoted gave a clear understanding about the plight of the majority of Colombians 
that do not support either the Conservative or Liberal political parties. It has also been observed 
that FARC displayed a reactionary platform due to Colombia’s domestic environment constantly 
riddled with political violence and militant aggression.
12
 By basing themselves in rural, remote 
regions where government services are not available to those in need, FARC has taken a 
prominent role in being the primary fountain for providing social services, conflict mediation, 
and public order.
13
 The overall positive message that FARC advocates is very alluring for any 
oppressed population and vital for its existence to carry out guerrilla activities. 
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The impact that FARC’s guerrilla activities has within Colombia’s domestic sphere 
demonstrates how it gained recognition as a formidable insurgent group. Since 1964, FARC has 
been considered one of the longest enduring guerrilla movements in the world.
14
 It is also 
considered to have one of the largest and best-equipped guerrilla forces.
15
 FARC has engaged in 
guerrilla warfare through territorial conquests, kidnapping politicians and important individuals, 
and direct combat with government troops.
16
 This illustrates how committed FARC guerrillas are 
willing to engage in violence for the sake of raising awareness of the incompetence of 
Colombian state actors. Although it has been argued that the promotion of platforms to end 
social inequalities should be done through peaceful measures, it does not seem to be the best 
route for FARC’s activities due the surmountable amount of repression enforced by Colombia’s 
government. FARC advises its supporters to boycott elections and attack polling stations in order 
to prevent incompetent politicians from being elected.
17
 It also has been observed that FARC’s 
guerrilla tactics involve the usage of explosive techniques similar to the ones deployed by 
terrorists in Northern Ireland and Spain.
18
 FARC has been designated a controversial non-state 
actor due to the deriving income it receives from drug trades and kidnapping ransoms.
19
 As a 
result, FARC has been deemed notorious and detrimental to Colombia’s domestic security and 
even considered a threat to international security. 
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The international and domestic reactions towards FARC and its activities are very 
paradoxical. The United States and the European Union have deemed this non-state actor as a 
terrorist organization.
20
 The United States has been heavily involved in providing financial and 
military assistance to the Colombian government to enact counterterrorist measures.
21
 Most 
Western governments flatly reject and dismiss FARC as a dangerous group to the public, yet 
haven’t really navigated or explored its origins or the criticism that FARC makes towards 
Colombia’s government.
22
 This is an understandable perspective considering the tumultuous 
outcomes that have resulted from the clashes between Colombian government troops and FARC 
guerrillas. Due to the conflict between non-state actor groups with Colombia’s state actors, 
Colombia has succumbed into a civil war that has resulted in a catastrophic death count of 
35,000 people within the last ten years.
23
 However, this does not give outside state actors the 
leeway to presume that quashing guerrilla forces will establish peace within Colombia. Instead, 
outside state actors should review their comprehension of what brings guerrilla movements into 
fruition and what kind of social issues they seek to rectify. 
Despite the lack of international recognition and condemnation from Colombia’s 
government, FARC has been able to recruit many civilians in fighting for their cause. Although 
FARC has shown no intentions of becoming a political party through electing officials, their 
impact can been seen through their community-level activities towards people who have no 
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access to government-run resources.
24
 This can be exemplified by FARC’s notorious relationship 
with the narcotics trade, in which they are able to provide employment for farmers and laborers 
by cultivating sustainable cocoa crops on farms owned by drug traffickers.
25
 Although it may 
appear criminal that FARC is involved in these illicit activities, it assists with the displaced 
farmers in need of gaining higher wages to provide for their families – this is especially 
significant since working on corporate-owned farms would produce a low wage and no job 
security.
26
 By taking a stance against the status quo of Colombia’s negligent policies, FARC also 
challenged the restriction on women’s activities and assigned gender roles by including them in 
guerrilla warfare and terrorist activities.
27
 This demonstrates that Colombia’s state actors failed 
to recognize and consider the social inequalities that Colombian women have experienced. 
Through enlisting themselves with FARC, Colombian women hoped to have their demands 
recognized by a non-state actor instead. 
b. The Nascent of Chechnya’s Insurgency 
The origins of the Chechen population’s petition for self-determination can be traced back to 
the brutal regime of Stalin. The Chechens were among the many ethnic groups under Soviet rule 
that were accused of working with Germany from 1943 – 1944.
28
 As a result, they lived in exile 
in Central Asia.
29
 From the 618,000 that were deported, a third of the population died.
30
 This 
portrayed the failure of the Soviet government in protecting and supporting the interests of this 
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non-Russian population. This would also mark the beginning of Chechens’ animosity towards 
Soviet rule. Eventually, Stalin would create multiethnic republics in order to prevent these ethnic 
groups from uniting to challenge Soviet rule.
31
 The region of Chechnya is located 1,000 miles 
south of Moscow between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.
32
 Although Chechnya didn’t 
produce an uprising, it would remain preoccupied by old grievances and national 
consciousness.
33
 Like other republics within Eastern European regions under Soviet rule, 
Chechnya sought to declare independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
34
 The 
end of Soviet rule permitted some republics the opportunity to pursue their nationalist endeavors 
in forming self-sufficient governments no longer dependent on Russian control. It was the 
perfect environment for Chechens to disengage themselves from the inadequacies of Russian 
state actors. 
Alongside this demand for self-sovereignty, Chechnya was plagued with domestic problems 
of their own. Chechnya was dealing with high unemployment rates, poverty, government failure, 
and lack of guidance by pro-Russian political leaders who did not provide a resolution in 
creating an alternative that would permit Chechnya to have a self-sufficient government.
35
 Once 
again, Chechens were suffering under other state actors that were not resolving their issues. A 
former Soviet military officer named Dzhokar Dudayev would lead a nationalist movement 
coming into fruition.
36
 Dudayev would eventually become President of Chechnya and 




 Francine Banner, “Uncivil wars: ‘Suicide bomber identity’ as a product of Russo-Chechen conflict.” Religion, State 
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33
 Rajan Menon and Graham E. Fuller, “Russia’s Ruinous Chechen War.” Foreign Affairs 79, no.2 (2000): 34. 
34
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& Society 34, no.3 (2006): 222. 
35
 Ibid, 222 – 223.  
36
 Ibid, 232. 
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encouraged the formation of a separatist government from Russia.
37
 Russia’s former Prime 
Minister Boris Yeltsin approved to dispatch a coup d’état in August 1991 to remove Dudayev 
from power and reassert Russian control, but it failed. This would prompt Chechnya’s immediate 
approval of a de facto secession from the former Soviet Union.
38
 This would further test 
Chechnya’s separatist commitments as a conflict would inevitably erupt between Russia and 
Chechnya. 
The clash between Russia and Chechnya based on different stances towards Chechen 
independence would lead to the first Russo-Chechen War. Chechnya would remain under a de 
facto independence until December 1994, when the Russian Army launched a massive attack in 
Grozny, the Chechen capital, in attempts to regain Chechen control.
39
 Galina Stavoitova, 
Yeltsin’s adviser, described the following reasons for the former prime minister’s willingness to 
fight Chechnya: distract the Russian population from economic reforms with a victorious war, 
provide its troops a chance to redeem themselves after suffering huge losses in Afghanistan, and 
protect economic interests involving the pipeline route that was under Chechen territory.
40
 
Furthermore, Grozny was an ideal place for smuggling massive amounts of Russian weapons, 
oil, drugs, and money laundering for Russian officials and politicians.
41
 Many economic interests 
from Russia were being threatened, further proving to Russia that the Chechen nationalist 
movement had to be defeated. This would only provoke the Chechens to unite in fighting against 
the Russian intervention. The first war would end in August 1996 with both Chechens and 
                                                          
37
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Russians agreeing to sign the Khasavyurt Peace Accord.
42
 Although it provided temporary peace 
between both sides, this truce would only last three years.  
The Second Chechen War would prove to be more costly due to influence and rise of new 
non-state actors and new forms of warfare. During the first Chechen War, Wahhabi militants 
from Saudi Arabia joined the Chechen separatists to support their cause to secede from Russia by 
giving them access to financial resources, weapons, and trained terrorists.
43
  The Wahhabi 
militants were drawn to the Chechen cause in light of the fact that its population was 
predominantly Muslim – this would give them the chance to spread the message of Islamic jihad 
on an international scale.
44
 Although the Chechens were grateful for this opportunity to receive 
aid, their main priority was to seek separation from Russia.
45
 Chechens were mainly preoccupied 
with gaining secession from Russia, not with sponsoring any religious messages. During the 
period of 1996 – 1999, Chechnya still could not recover from the first war and was suffering 
from high crime rates, kidnappings, poverty, and attacks on foreign aid workers.
46
 This chaotic 
atmosphere served as the perfect environment for the emergence of a different form of political 
Islam, which promoted a state governed by Islamic law in order to establish piety, solidarity, and 
mutual welfare within the Chechen region.
47
 As a result, the Chechen insurgency had integrated 
ties with Al Qaeda, Al-Qaeda affiliated organizations, and Chechen warlords.
48
 This alliance 
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with other non-state actors provided the line of support the Chechen insurgent movement needed 
to challenge the inadequacy of the Chechen state actors. 
The rise of religious interests within Chechen insurgency would remain prevalent and 
debatable throughout the Russo-Chechen conflict. The new combination of nationalist and 
religious attachments would play a role in the outbreak of the Second Chechen war.
49
 In August 
1999, radical Islamists from Chechnya enacted revolts in the neighboring Russian republic of 
Dagestan.
50
 The lack of stability within the Chechen Republic led to Russia’s decision to send 
another intervention within the region.
51
 While the first Chechen war occurred for the sake of 
restoring law and order within the Chechen Republic, the Second Chechen war occurred as a 
necessity to quell terrorist demands.
52
 Although the Wahhabis promoted their cause and 
convinced Chechen insurgent fighters to support it, it does not appear to be the main motivation 
for Chechens to engage in combat with Russia.
53
 It has been noted that Chechen rebels downplay 
the significance of Wahhabi militants within the region as they claim that their main struggle 
against Russia is to seek secession.
54
 Nevertheless, the influence of the Wahhabis did bring about 
a new method of warfare that was not used in the first Chechen war – suicide bombing missions. 
The impact of the Chechen insurgency and the Wahhabis can be seen through the progression 
of female participation within the Chechen nationalist movement. The abuse that Russian troops 
committed towards Chechens would provide the push needed for Chechen women to participate 
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 The Chechen conflict launched Chechen women into the role as vocal 
representatives within the public sphere.
56
  Female insurgents were initially used to supply 
medical aid, food, and water to the men; they also carried weapons and ammunition across 
enemy territory throughout both Chechen wars.
57
 These would be the first steps taken by 
Chechen women in becoming involved in an insurgent movement that would eventually beget 
their willingness to engage in terrorist activities. Gonzalez-Perez discusses how Chechen women 
would take up arms and train to become soldiers and fighters.
58
  The influence of the Wahhabis’ 
warfare tactics caused enlisted women to become the primary forces in suicide missions.
59
 The 
label of “Black Widows” perfectly reflected the high percentage of females who lost their 
husbands in the military conflict.
60
 The Black Widows evolved into becoming the primal 
instrument and symbol of the Chechen terrorist jihad.
61
  This also illustrates a new norm for 
Chechen women in having dominant militant roles to engage in acts of violence for the sake of 
gaining victory for a non-state actor. 
c. Comparative Analysis of Colombian and Chechen Insurgencies 
The birth stages of insurgent groups within Colombia and Chechnya were able to gain 
momentum because of the lack of capability on the state actors’ part to serve and provide for its 
civilians. In the case of Colombia, the nation became involved in a civil war due to the absence 
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of agreement between two political parties that could not come to terms on how to run 
Colombia’s government. Consequently, many people would suffer greatly as this period 
produced massive chaos and deaths. In the case of the Chechen republic, its population sought 
independence from Russia because the state failed to serve and provide for the Chechens, a non-
Russian ethnicity. The majority of Colombians and Chechens suffered from negligence and 
exclusion from their governments and therefore pursued other alternative methods that would 
recognize and satisfy their needs. Both insurgencies share similarities in the sense that they 
sought to obtain their demands through non-peaceful measures. The FARC insurgency and 
Chechen insurgency were very popular amongst civilians because they displayed themselves as 
the solution to acknowledge and ease the plight of civilians, while reiterating the burdens that 
were being caused by government negligence. As a result, both movements embraced the claim 
that non-state actors can fix the failures of state actors.  
Although Colombian and Chechen insurgencies originally sought to accomplish different 
objectives, they stirred the same reaction from outside state actors and they both ended up being 
classified as terrorist forces. For Colombia, FARC was created in order to improve the 
circumstances of poor and oppressed Colombians through reformed measures of social, 
economic, and political means. The civil conflict that arose between FARC guerrillas and 
Colombian government troops, along with the FARC collaboration with the narcotics business 
prompted assumptions that the FARC insurgency threatened international security. This caused 
FARC to receive the terrorist label. For Chechnya during the first war, the insurgency 
endeavored to defeat Russian intervention by engaging in combat for the sake of achieving 
independence. The second Chechen war was mostly defined by new modes of warfare such as 
suicide bombing in order to spread and promote an Islamic jihad message. The intention of 
14 
 
gaining secession from Russia seemed to be overlooked and ignored. Hence, Chechen insurgents 
would also be labeled as terrorists. 
Both the Colombian civil conflict and Chechen wars caused many female victims of warfare 
to join the insurgent movements. Instead of remaining voiceless throughout the ongoing conflict, 
Colombian women joined the FARC to become guerrilleras and Chechen women joined the 
insurgency as suicide bombers (later called the Black Widows). The acknowledgement of FARC 
guerrilleras and Black Widows made by the media, non-governmental organizations, and 
scholarly research expose the consequences of state actors’ mistreatment of women prior and 
during the civil conflicts within Colombia and Chechnya. The rise and benefits of Colombian 
and Chechen insurgencies through female recruitment will be the next discussion of this paper. 
II. Benefits of Female Recruitment & Motivations within Colombian and Chechen 
Insurgencies 
a. Female Recruitment & Motives for FARC Insurgency 
Rise and Benefits of Female Terrorism for FARC Insurgency 
 By presenting themselves as the utopic solution for Colombia’s illegitimate domestic 
policies, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia became an attractive non-state actor 
for guerrilla recruitment. According to Herrera and Porch, FARC was successful in pointing out 
the flaws of Colombian governance – social inequality, violence from right-wing Colombian 
army and paramilitary groups, ethnic and racial grievances within indigenous and Afro-
Colombian communities, limited education and job opportunities.
62
 This statement 
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acknowledges the correlation between civilians’ ethnic/racial heritage and poverty within 
Colombia. It also proves that state actors governing Colombia have failed to recognize and enact 
policies that would implement egalitarian outcomes. FARC has served as an alternative form of 
law and order by having control and running schools, courts, and broadcast stations.
63
 This 
demonstrates that FARC identifies neglectful institutions and present themselves as the viable 
solution for Colombians to experience social reform. FARC’s staunch support for land reform, 
improving social welfare and state control of natural resources would eventually attract 
Colombian women.
64
 By 2002, female members made up between 40% - 45% of the 18,000 
FARC members.
65
 The FARC propaganda was successful in recruiting women to join their 
insurgent cause. 
 The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia reaped many positive outcomes and 
benefits from recruiting and training female guerrilleras. According to a former FARC company 
commander, it was essential for women to be involved in order to strengthen FARC’s role upon 
Colombian society.
66
  Although Colombian paramilitaries do include some women among their 
ranks, between twenty-five and fifty percent of FARC guerrillas are female.
67
 This indicates that 
women are not equally recruited into state-led military forces. By joining FARC, women can 
play a vital role in increasing the influence and actions of a non-state actor group within a 
country. According to Boyes, the purpose of having FARC guerrilleras were to fight, replenish 
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the ranks, nurse the wounded, and sustain morale amongst FARC male combatants.
68
 FARC 
female members performed a variety of roles within the organization and not confined to the 
caregiving, nurturing role that is usually assigned to females. Guerrilleras softened the perception 
of FARC’s notoriety by participating in photo-ops and interacting with civilians in FARC-
controlled territories.
69
 FARC used these images to their advantage, demonstrating to Colombian 
communities that they were nothing like the state-led troops. It also assisted in showing the 
public that FARC did not discriminate its membership based on gender. Furthermore, female 
fighters served as liaisons in taking care of the interests and safety of female civilians and 
mediating domestic and community disputes.
70
 Under FARC, guerrilleras adopted new roles as 
representatives of a non-state actor group by promoting the message of FARC’s goals and 
accomplishments. Another plus was that guerrilleras forced the Colombian military to engage in 
violence with members considered non-combatants.
71
 Colombia’s government troops would 
inevitably face guerrilleras in combat, proving that guerrilleras were adept in undermining 
Colombian state security. 
FARC has been effective in its endeavors of recruiting guerrilleras since they address the 
obstacles and discrimination that many Colombian women endure. Eighty percent of guerrilleras 
were from a peasant background, indicating that women were suffering poor socioeconomic 
circumstances.
72
 The message of FARC for reforms and social justice appealed to women who 
were ignored. FARC’s stance on gender equality also permitted women to escape from the social 
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 FARC gave women the opportunity to be liberated economically and 
socially. FARC also distributed pamphlets to the public showing statistics concerning poverty 
rates, forced displacement, and how women are more likely than men to be victims of homicides 
and sexual violence.
74
 The statistics also claim how women are more likely than men to be heads 
of the household, thus being the sole breadwinners for their family.
75
 The distribution of these 
pamphlets reveals that FARC is targeting specific demographics within the country that are 
being oppressed by careless state actors. This also shows that FARC is reaching out to women by 
portraying themselves as the rightful group to rally behind. According to an interview with a 
FARC leader, he states, “a woman perceives injustice through every pore in her body; from the 
moment she is born, she is discriminated against”.
76
 By reaching out to women, FARC has been 
able to gain a huge number of new members to participate in its organization. 
Improving Gender Equality 
 Many women seek to join the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia because of 
the potential egalitarian benefits that they have the potential to gain. FARC portrays itself as the 
perfect remedy for permitting women to gain autonomy, sexual freedom, and the opportunity to 
prove themselves as capable as male guerrillas.
77
 This form of empowerment permits them to 
take unorthodox positions not usually available to women, such as commanding guerrilla 
fronts.
78
 As a guerrillera, a Colombian woman can assist in rebelling against state actors that 
were irresponsible in addressing the machismo culture and other sexist norms. FARC 
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Commander Andres Paris said that the increase in female enrollment within the insurgency was 
due to its support for gender equality.
79
 The invisibility of access to economic, political, and 
social rights was considered a huge motive for women to join FARC.
80
 Welsh observes that the 
majority of the insurgent members (both male and female) are indigenous or Afro-Colombian, 
displaying that FARC does not show discrimination towards these marginalized groups either.
81
 
It can be inferred that these women seek to participate in insurgent activities with great optimism 
and hope. FARC gives them the chance to find their own strength by carrying out actions that 
defend its revolutionary ideals.  
 By joining FARC, female civilians are rebelling against the status quo of the constrictions 
imposed to their gender. According to Gonzalez-Perez, guerrilleras claimed that FARC made 
them feel liberated from the repressive macho tendencies that are normal within Colombia.
82
 She 
cites the opinion of anthropologist Maria Eugenia Vasquez, who states that “in a country where 
women are usually ignored, guerrilleras are surrounded by symbols that give them an identity”.
83
 
This opinion successfully summarizes the lack of support that females receive from Colombian 
society and feel that this insurgency will befit their social needs. Many Colombian females are 
raised to believe that marriage and pregnancy are the means of securing their identities.
84
 This 
shows that there are limited options available for female civilians to choose from. Marriage and 
motherhood seem to be the only choices for Colombian women to assert their gender identity 
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and gain some value within society. Guerrilleras also claimed that joining this insurgent group 
gave them the chance to prove their worth as women, thus helping them pursue a different sense 
of gender identity.
85
 Guerrilleras are rebelling against both state corruption and hyper-masculine 
social norms – by steering away from marriage and motherhood, female insurgents are willing to 
explore different gender identity norms that are unconventional and unique from the culture they 
grew up in. Some women truly believed that joining the FARC insurgency would lead them to 
do meaningful work that would make their lives fulfilling.
86
 This reveals that most female 
insurgents would like to improve their own lives and the lives of others through social reform. It 
can be argued that the inclusion of women within the public sphere will lead to the rise of more 
awareness to the plight of the majority of Colombians that are withstanding the consequences of 
corruption and injustices.  
The transition from being civilian to being guerrillera has proven to have a positive 
impact for some female insurgents. A FARC guerrilla leader named Joaquín Gomez supports the 
notion that female guerrilleras are invaluable to FARC, since they are also part of the “people’s 
war”.
87
 The leader is referring to the struggle between poor civilians marginalized by Colombian 
state policies. This phrase also dares to suggest that the justification to leave women invisible 
within the insurgency fight is not the right path. It has been noted that guerrilleras are aware of 
the challenges of living in the jungle and the need to adopt a different lifestyle when carrying out 
insurgent activities, but most guerrilleras are content with this work.
88
 Female insurgents have 
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given this a lot of thought prior to making a decision in joining the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia. Furthermore, FARC guerrilleras claim that they truly have an 
equal stance with male guerrilla members since their responsibilities vary from performing guard 
duty, gathering intelligence, fighting in combat, and serving as field commanders.
89
 These tasks 
are very essential within the operations of an insurgent organization in order to remain effective 
and successful. Therefore, guerrilleras appear very content in gaining new skills and adopting a 
stronger confidence in their gender identities that would not have occurred if they remained 
civilians. 
 Despite the benefits of having an insurgent group claiming to support egalitarian notions, 
FARC has been criticized for not maintaining them. A guerrillera named Olga explained how 
FARC has made little effort in promoting gender equality because guerrilleras were expected to 
never disagree with their male counterparts during a meeting.
90
 Unfortunately, not every female 
insurgent is experiencing a fair relationship with their fellow male comrades. The prevalent view 
that Colombian women are weaker and vulnerable gives many male guerrilla members a difficult 
time to treat female combatants with respect.
91
 It is possible that most FARC commanders 
presume every guerrilla is treated fairly, thus not making a conscious effort to encourage gender 
equality. Most male guerrilla members are not accustomed to treating women equally, so this 
definitely can create strained relations between male and female insurgents. Another guerrillera 
named Cristina revealed how she had to go through a painful and risky late-term abortion 
because having a baby would have impeded her to carry out her duties as a FARC insurgent 
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 Her account is one of the many that contradict the claim that FARC supports the idea 
that female insurgents have sole control over their reproductive rights. Another factor that has 
caused FARC to face severe scrutiny is the age of the insurgents they recruit. Jordan observed 
how many FARC guerrilleras join the insurgency in their teenage years.
93
 Most of them join for 
a variety of reasons such as boredom, to pursue an alternative lifestyle other than marriage, or 
were easily impressed by FARC’s ideology.
94
 These observations indicate that FARC does not 
take into consideration the age of the civilians that seek to join them, proving to be detrimental to 
their image as taking advantage by using child soldiers (both male and female) to gain more 
insurgent fighters. This provides further elucidation as to why it is problematic for domestic and 
international state actors to recognize and legitimize the FARC insurgency. 
Limited Opportunities 
 The lack of educational and socioeconomic opportunities is one of the most impacting 
reasons for female civilians to join the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. 
Gonzalez-Perez states that education is not available to girls within Colombia’s rural 
population.
95
 Statistics show that wages for Colombian women are sixty percent lower than 
Colombian men and illiteracy is six percent higher among women than men.
96
 Colombian 
females do not have the luxury for socioeconomic mobility, therefore they are more likely to 
remain impoverished. As a result, many females join FARC due to the lack of access to a better 
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 The FARC insurgency seems to illuminate a positive message that its members can 
escape from the stagnant hold of poverty. The Human Rights Watch testifies that younger people 
join non-state military forces in response to the deficiency of resources within rural 
communities.
98
 This can be exemplified by a guerrillera named Laura, who left her rural 
community to participate in the FARC insurgency because it would provide more prospects for 
her rather than remaining at home.
99
 FARC exhibits itself as a reliable force that will not shirk 
away from responsibilities towards providing relief to the Colombian population. Another 
guerrillera named María Clara believed that joining FARC would give her a better chance at 
achieving her dream of becoming a doctor.
100
 Although she was aware that the insurgency would 
not openly give her immediate access to studying medicine, it was a better option than to remain 
destitute.
101
 Having little access to education endeavors and socioeconomic mobility proves to 
have detrimental effects for Colombian women. 
The lack of resources for social mobility signals the increase in Colombian female 
numbers to seek refuge within FARC guerrilla forces. De La Vega remarks how many young 
members of FARC apparently had only three choices when their parents were killed by the 
ongoing civil conflict – join the guerrillas, join a street gang, or prostitution.
102
 These options 
were the only way for them to find the means to survive. Tabak discusses how women joined 
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FARC out of fear of becoming a victim of guerrilla warfare.
103
 The chaos and violence between 
both government-sponsored troops and guerrilla forces pushed women to seek out the protection 
of an armed group. A former female ex-combatant spoke about how a FARC guerrilla member 
would drop by her house to discuss the benefits of getting an education through FARC 
membership, especially since her hometown could not afford to educate the youth.
104
 Although 
FARC is armed and dangerous, it seems to be the only reliable actor to provide some aid to 
Colombians. Tabak observed how both male and female combatants share the same reasons for 
becoming guerrillas – lack of education and opportunity, dedication to FARC’s ideology, and 
fighting for social reform.
105
 According to Welsh, poor, rural women can alleviate their troubles 
by becoming FARC guerrilleras.
106
 Welsh continues saying that women joining FARC represent 
the lack of options available for women and the need for change within Colombian society.
107
 
Having limited opportunity creates the perfect environment for breeding civil conflict and the 
rise of non-state actors such as the FARC insurgency. 
Victims of Family Abuse 
 Another main motive that prompted females to join the FARC insurgency was the 
hardships of living in an unstable and abusive environment at home. Demobilized FARC female 
combatants confessed that they suffered from early childhood abuse from close family 
members.
108
 Many women interviewed came from bad domestic situations such as being under 
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the care of neglectful relatives.
109
 FARC offered a precious sanctuary that gave women the 
chance to be independent from hostile environments. Welsh points out how Colombian females 
are prone to be victims of verbal abuse and domestic violence inflicted by male relatives as a 
way to establish dominant control within the household.
110
 A former FARC combatant named 
Isabel confessed how her father abused her from a very young age and continued to do so until 
she joined FARC.
111
 She felt a sense of empowerment and strength and she was convinced that 
her father could not hurt her or anyone else – FARC was the perfect escape from her situation.
112
 
These interviews point out how brave these combatants are as they were willing to participate in 
a non-state actor group to receive protection and independence. It also demonstrates that female 
combatants do not have accessible or available social programs that can provide them counseling 
and protection from their abusive relatives. 
The FARC insurgency unintentionally served as a haven that permitted its female 
combatants to heal from their abuse. Joining FARC was a form of rebellion against the unhealthy 
lifestyle that some females were forced to acquiesce to.
113
 According to an interview with a 
FARC female combatant, Viviana spoke about the time when she was introduced to the FARC 
guerrilla forces, and felt that she could identify with their ideology.
114
 She strongly believed that 
she encountered the love of a family through her comrades.
115
 Another guerrillera named María 
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claimed that joining the FARC insurgency served as the perfect flight for her to escape from the 
abuse she endured while living with her grandmother.
116
 The irony presented is that despite the 
risks and dangers that the FARC insurgency contained, María felt it was a safer place than her 
home.
117
 Herrera and Porch analyze how some statistics gathered on motivations for enlistment 
are not always accurate.
118
 For instance, among the demobilized FARC combatants (both male 
and female) that surrendered between January 2006 – April 2006, only four percent claimed that 
living in an abusive environment was their main motivation to become guerrillas. However, 
fifty-five percent of these combatants claimed to have suffered physical and verbal abuse as 
children.
119
 These interviews show that addressing domestic violence is taboo and somewhat 
considered a social norm within Colombian society. It also shows that more quantitative analyses 
are needed to further explore and comprehend which specific or amalgamation of reasons are 
prevalent in the decision-making process for females to become guerrilleras.  
Positive Role Models 
 An interesting motive that caused females to participate in the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia was to the exposure of positive role models already involved 
within the insurgency. A FARC guerrillera named Camila was first exposed to FARC ideologies 
through her parents, who were members of the Communist Party.
120
 Although her father would 
be killed by paramilitary forces, Camila still joined FARC because she believed it was necessary 
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to bring forth change within Colombia.
121
 Camila sought to be in the insurgency to implement 
social reform based on the ideology her father taught her. Another guerrillera named Lucia had a 
positive experience with FARC since her father was acquainted with one of the FARC 
commanders and she would accompany him to their camps.
122
 This demonstrates that some 
guerrilleras were actually encouraged by their parents to fight for social justice and equality 
through the insurgency. According to some testimonies, some FARC guerrilleras grew up in 
villages controlled by FARC guerrillas and saw how these women wore uniforms and were 
armed like their male counterparts.
123
 They considered these women as symbols of strength, 
beauty, and role models to look up to.
124
 Being exposed to such strong imagery had a tremendous 
impact on these girls as they saw the potential of what they could become. Another FARC 
combatant named Elena told how she grew up seeing guerrilleras of Afro-Colombian descent 
wearing uniforms and rifles, looking like glamorous figures.
125
 These interviews are a good 
reflection of how positive role models can invoke ordinary and marginalized female individuals 
to become important figures in pushing for equality and reform. 
Colombian State Troops and Paramilitary Forces – Perpetrators of Violence 
 The gruesome actions carried out by government-led troops and paramilitary forces 
caused many Colombian women to become victims of violent crimes. Paramilitary forces are 
other non-state actors encouraged by the Colombian Army as an alternative to perform counter-
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 Like FARC, paramilitary groups receive some support and 
collaboration from drug traffickers, but their sole purpose is to target and eradicate leftist 
guerrilla groups.
127
 Herman states that both paramilitaries and government-led troops appear 
united in eradicating leftist forces, especially the FARC insurgency.
128
 This demonstrates that 
Colombian state actors are willing to cooperate with a non-state actor as long as their interests 
are not threatened. Colombian paramilitary groups are notorious for raping, murdering, and 
mutilating women.
129
 In an interview with a guerrillera named Soraida, she discussed how the 
army took her brother and falsely accused him of being a guerrilla, only to shoot him six times in 
front of the whole town.
130
 This prompted her to join FARC as a way to get revenge.
131
 The 
crimes committed by government troops and paramilitaries partly reveal why insurgencies are 
formed and gain a huge amount of support from many Colombians. By participating in FARC, 
women no longer have to remain victimized by soldiers and paramilitary troops and are given the 
opportunity to fight back. 
The actions of all armed groups within Colombia, including FARC, have come under 
strict scrutiny to identify any human rights violations. Amnesty International claims that between 
sixty and seventy percent of Colombian women experience sexual violence in their lives.
132
 The 
official figures presented by the Colombian government do not accurately measure the epidemic 
of sexual violence within the country due to the victims remaining silent about their rape 
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experiences, lack of autopsy reports recording physical evidence of sexual assault, and failure to 
hold perpetrators accountable.
133
 According to the 2003 UNDP Human Development Report on 
Colombia, the number of women killed outside of combat increased by twenty percent during 
2000 – 2002.
134
 Within this timeframe, women accounted for six percent of all deaths in and out 
of combat and disappearance, ten percent of tortures, eleven percent of all land-mine related 
deaths and eighteen percent of kidnappings.
135
 This evidence uncovers the deleterious 
consequences of a country failing to resolve a civil conflict. Violence against women is an 
effective instrument to instill fear among civilians.
136
 In 2003, over 220 women were killed 
outside of combat and twenty women disappeared.
137
 State-led troops were responsible for five 
percent of these killings, paramilitary forces caused twenty-six percent of these killings, and 
guerrilla forces caused sixteen percent of the killings.
138
 These quantitative findings provide 
proof that FARC portrays itself as the protector of Colombians, yet it carries out the same violent 
tactics that both soldiers and paramilitary members inflict on civilians.  
Coercive Measures – Payment and Abuse 
There have been controversial accounts acknowledging that FARC used coercive 
methods in order to gain more combatants. According to De La Vega, the deserters interviewed 
asserted that they became guerrillas forcefully because FARC was threatening their family.
139
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Other deserters said that they had to join because of their families lacking the means to pay taxes 
to FARC.
140
 It is known that some girls are given by their parents into armed services as a form 
of tax payment to the armed group that controls the area.
141
 This shows that FARC uses slavery 
as a means to gain more people to assist with the operations of their insurgent activities. Despite 
its vocal position for equality and social change, FARC has failed to respect the free will of 
individuals. This form of extortion also implies that FARC is lacking the finances necessary to 
fund insurgent activities and are probably not very popular with certain towns and villages. 
Another account given by Rosa revealed how her abusive father joined FARC and got some 
guerrillas to kidnap and subject her to verbal and physical abuse.
142
 This portrays FARC as the 
least safe haven for females to seek refuge in. They also had Rosa’s sister captive, and she tried 
to commit suicide.
143
 This exposes FARC to be a violent perpetrator no better than state-led 
troops and paramilitary groups. 
These coercive and violent deeds committed by the FARC insurgency caused both 
Colombians and outsiders to question whether the insurgent group remains devoted to its original 
agenda. There are reports that FARC commanders force their female combatants to use 
contraception and have abortions.
144
 Other women have been victimized by guerrilla attacks 
based on reports that place them fraternizing with government troops or paramilitaries.
145
 
According to a report conducted by Amnesty International, both guerrilla and paramilitary 




 Dylan Mazurana and Susan McKay, “Child Soldiers: What about the girls?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57, 
no.5 (2001): 32. 
142
 Amnesty International. Colombia: Scarred bodies, hidden crimes: Sexual Violence against women in the armed 
conflict. AI Index: AMR 23/040/2004AI. (London, U.K.: Amnesty International Secretariat Peter Benenson House, 
2004), 10. 
143
 See note 142 above. 
144
 Amnesty International. Colombia: Scarred bodies, hidden crimes: Sexual Violence against women in the armed 






groups in Colombia recruit women and girls in their ranks that were sexually abused by their 
fellow male comrades.
146
 This puts guerrilleras in a position to be both victims and perpetrators 
of insurgent violence. Tabak admits that a huge distortion is presented when figuring out whether 
or not the public should view FARC guerrilleras as victims that were forced to carry out FARC 
actions or persons who acted out their desire to fight as perpetrators.
147
 These accounts only 
place the blame on FARC male combatants, not female combatants. Tabak also criticizes how 
most non-government organizations fail to discuss the status of women as female combatants.
148
 
Most reports made by human rights organizations have the propensity to ignore the precarious 
role of female fighters.
149
 This indicates that more qualitative and quantitative research are 
needed to examine if FARC female combatants seek to join the insurgency in order to inflict 
dominant behavior on others, and whether or not they force other female civilians to join FARC 
by whatever means necessary. 
b. Female Recruitment & Motives for Chechen Insurgency 
Rise and Benefits of Female Terrorism for Chechen Insurgency 
The involvement of Chechen women in the conflict against Russia was a gradual process. 
Bodansky argues that the consequences of the first Chechen War were far greater than the 
second war, yet it did not witness any suicide bombings.
150
 Weinberg and Eubank’s Black 
Widows case study revealed that an increase of female participation in suicide attacks were 
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 The evidence presented by Bodansky, Weinberg, and Eubank displays 
that Chechen women were not always involved in the separatist cause from the commencement 
of the first Chechen War. They still endured the consequences of the war outbreaks with Russia 
and patriarchal norms still governed their way of life. Weinberg and Eubank believe that women 
usually tend to be late-comers to terrorism.
152
 This may have to do with the fact that women were 
not seen as possible prospects or influential enough to be useful in the Chechen nationalist 
movement. The Second Chechen War was primarily Islamist in character and exploited religious 
devotion as well as shame and despair to drive women to attempt martyrdom in Chechnya.
153
 
The role of Islamic jihad justified Chechen women to sacrifice themselves for their loss of loved 
ones, nationalist beliefs, and served as a prominent tool in altering the gender norm as they 
engaged in terrorist acts. Whereas the first Chechen war caused women to be perceived as 
victims, the second Chechen war opened a new role for women to become perpetrators of 
terrorism. 
Chechen women were already exposed to the Chechen insurgent movement through personal 
ties. According to Murphy, networking is identified as a successful tool for Chechen women to 
engage in terrorism.
154
 Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev used local representatives to identify, 
target, and cultivate female recruits; this was accomplished by exploiting their personal needs, 
weaknesses, grievances, friendships, allegiances, family obligations, traditional Chechen culture, 
and Muslim beliefs.
155
 The role that these local representatives played in reaching out to 
potential Black Widows would have a tremendous effect in prompting these women to recognize 
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the significance and potential benefits of engaging in terrorist activities. Although these local 
representatives seem to play a small role, they were essential for the Chechen insurgency to 
remain significant amongst the Chechen population. These local representatives exhibit the 
effective role that non-state actors can have upon a specific demographic that has been constantly 
neglected by state actors. The significance of kinship can be seen through a study conducted by 
Speckhard and Akhmedova, which revealed that twenty-seven percent of the female suicide 
bombers were affiliated with the Wahhabis by marriage or family ties but later began to become 
more deeply invested in seeking the terror-promoting aspects of these groups.
156
 By having 
personal attachments with the Wahhabis, Chechen women were exposed to both the nationalist 
and Islamic incentives for martyrdom. This demonstrates the prominent role that kinship played 
on Chechen women to become exposed to influential ideology leading them to participate in 
terrorist activities. 
The Chechen nationalist movement would eventually recognize the benefits of recruiting 
women in their insurgent activities. Cunningham identifies the following reasons for terrorist 
organizations to recruit women to commit violent acts: the perception of their gender to be 
considered non-threatening, the tendency for women to be treated with more consideration when 
it comes to body cavity searches and the ability to appear pregnant can assist women to conceal 
weapons and bombs.
157
 In the case of Chechnya, the active role of the Black Widows committing 
terrorist acts would provoke a strong outcry from the public. Out of all the Chechen suicide 
attacks that occurred within June 2000 – June 2005, forty-three percent of them were carried out 
by the Black Widows in public places such as subway stations, military checkpoints, music and 
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 Cunningham, Speckhard, and Akhmedova agree that the Black Widows 
were effective terrorists and reliable actors in promoting Chechen secession. The popular opinion 
still considers women as victims of violence, not as perpetrators.
159
 This verifies that the topic of 
female terrorism still remains a new social norm for the public to accept. Nevertheless, the 
actions of the Black Widows exhibit that female civilians are capable of becoming terrorist 
perpetrators and can make a non-state actor become stronger in fighting against a repressive state 
actor. 
Role of Religion 
One of the main motives identified as the primary influence for Chechen women to join 
the insurgent movement is based upon the role of religion. The Second Chechen War was 
strongly identified as being driven primarily by Islamist ties and exploited religious devotion to 
drive women to undergo suicide missions in Chechnya.
160
 The faith of Islam was used to justify 
Chechen women in sacrificing themselves. It would also serve as a prominent tool in altering the 
gender norm as they engaged in terrorist acts. The oppressive circumstances of war and the 
influence of Islam introduced and legitimized the idea of self-cleansing through martyrdom 
bombing.
161
 Convincing women that becoming a suicide bomber was an act of religious duty 
inferred that it was an obligation to be carried out. This approach does not improve gender status, 
but merely serves as a reminder to Chechen women that obedience was always expected from 
them.  
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Another reason the Chechen insurgency gained support was the perception that their 
religious ways were being threatened by Russian intervention. For some women, the jihad 
message encouraged by the Wahhabis demonstrated the need for an Islam revival in Chechnya to 
unite religious identity within the region.
162
 Russian intervention meant that they could not 
practice Islam – this was an ultimate attack against their pursuit to remain faithfully devout.
163
  
The Black Widows seemed to comprehend that maintaining their religious ties to Islam was 
essential in order to accomplish the goal of gaining Chechen state sovereignty. Nivat points out 
that the relationship between nationalism and religion elucidates the reason why the Chechen 
wars commenced and how Chechen women became engaged in terrorist activities.
164
 According 
to Gonzalez-Perez, most Chechen women followed Sufism (the dominant form of Islam in 
Chechnya), which does not support martyrdom and strictly prohibits suicide – Wahhabism 
supports the opposite of this.
165
 The clash between these two different forms of Islam reveals 
why the Chechen insurgency remained neutral in order to prevent division within the Chechen 
population.  
Martyrdom is also identified as another significant variable for Chechen women to become 
Black Widows. Bloom examines how Abu Walid, a Saudi rebel commander, said that the wives 
of the martyred mujahedeen were menaced by Russian soldiers who threatened their honor in 
their own homes.
166
 These women would not accept being humiliated and live under the 
occupation, so they used martyrdom as a remedy to serve the cause of God and avenge their 
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 Victimized women would have their honor restored through martyrdom 
for the cause of Chechen secession. This account also reveals the significance of the role that 
Wahhabi Islam played during the Chechen conflict, serving as a justification for Chechen women 
to commit terrorist acts. According to Chechen sources, many of the women were victims of 
rape, which meant that they could never marry or have children, thus martyrdom appeared to be 
the only solution.
168
 This also indicates that the only form of emancipation that Chechen women 
could receive would be obtained through their willingness to sacrifice their lives. Speckhard and 
Akhmedova discovered evidence of women self-recruitment and strong willingness to martyr 
themselves on behalf of their country and independence from Russia, to enact social justice, and 
to avenge for the loss of loved ones in their families.
169
 This analysis seems to support the 
possibility that Black Widows were motivated by more than one reason to become terrorists for 
the Chechen insurgency. 
Revenge 
Another motive identified as the primary influence for Chechen women to join the 
insurgent movement is to gain revenge. Recruiters routinely target young women who have lost 
someone during the war.
170
 Chechen terrorist leaders emphasized the fact that many of the 
female suicide attackers acted following the death of a family member – usually their husbands – 
because of this conflict.
171
 This form of vulnerability was the perfect way for the Chechen 
insurgent movement to gain more female members, especially since most deceased family 
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members supported Chechnya’s secession. By framing the death of a family member as a threat 
to the honor of Chechen women, terrorist leaders promoted the notion that women should 
become suicide bombers in order to serve the group.
172
 Their personal sufferings were an 
essential recruitment tool aimed to provoke fear among the Russians to push them to recognize 
Chechen statehood. By becoming Black Widows, Chechen women were able to take some 
control and no longer had to be victimized by the sufferings they endured throughout the 
conflict. According to a study conducted by O’Rourke, it was discovered that eighty-eight 
percent of the suicide attackers had experienced the death of an immediate family member in the 
Chechen-Russian conflict and forty-seven percent of them had more than one family member 
killed.
173
 These staggering statistics indicate that these personal losses prompted Chechen 
women to relinquish the patriarchal norms established within their society to pursue terrorist acts 
for the sake of raising nationalist awareness within Russia. These personal losses have been 
capitalized by several of the terrorist groups to attract female attackers for the insurgent cause.
174
 
Participants of the Chechen insurgency gradually began to realize the potential effect that suicide 
bombers could have in promoting their cause. 
The death of a family member is considered a powerful motivation for Chechen women 
to become suicide bombers because it proves the consequences of becoming victimized by a civil 
conflict. Although Chechen society encourages the duty of getting revenge, women were not 
expected to do this.
175
 This social norm would definitely be challenged throughout the Chechen 
wars. Due to the severe casualties being caused by this conflict and the popular militant jihadist 
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ideology promoted by the Wahhabis within Chechen rebel groups, many women self-recruited 
and took part in suicide terrorism as a means of revenge against the Russian military.
176
 Having 
the opportunity to get revenge allowed the Black Widows a doorway to break another patriarchal 
norm which constrained gender roles. According to Cunningham, the impact of the death of a 
loved one or being the victim of a violent crime are the usual explanations when trying to fathom 
the reasons why women become involved in terrorist organizations.
177
 Bloom states that the 
female operatives in Chechnya were involved in performing acts of terrorism because many were 
the sisters, mothers, or wives of Chechen men killed in battle by federal Russian troops.
178
 The 
tragedy that Chechen women succumb to dehumanizes them, making insurgent activities a likely 
solution to overcome their grief and cope with their loss.  
Scholars have challenged the idea of religious duty being considered the prevalent factor 
in the rise of female suicide bombers within the Chechen insurgency by claiming revenge to be a 
stronger and more likely factor. Female Muslims were received by the Chechen insurgency as a 
result of an opportunistic method.
179
 This shows that it didn’t really matter if the female 
insurgents were truly devoted to the right for Chechnya’s solidarity; as long as they sought to 
commit themselves to complete a suicide bombing in the name of Chechen insurgency, there was 
no need to examine or look into how nationalist female recruits truly were. Murphy also presents 
Chechen ethnographer Zalpa Bersanova’s argument in which she has found no correlation 
between personal wartime losses and resentment towards Russian civilians.
180
 This demonstrates 






 Mia Bloom, “Female Suicide Bombers: A Global Trend,” Daedalus 136, no. 1 (2007): 96. 
179
 Yossef Bodansky, Chechen Jihad (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 258. 
180
 Paul Murphy, Allah's Angels: Chechen Women in War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 214. 
38 
 
that even though the Black Widows commit terrorist acts, they only sought the attention of the 
Russian government and its leaders who controlled Chechen sovereignty. 
The sentiments of revenge provided the perfect emotional conditions for Chechen women 
to commit themselves to terrorist acts. Bloom believes that Russian military actions played a 
significant role in traumatizing and stressing women to seek revenge, making them easy to 
persuade them to carry out a suicide mission.
181
 This proves that women do not automatically 
enact on their religious beliefs when it comes to suffering from a personal loss. Murphy presents 
a psychological opinion by Dr. Baiev, who states that Chechen suicide bombings are “largely 
motivated by a desire to take revenge for a family member killed by the Russians…Blood 
revenge, rather than religious extremism imported from the Middle East, governs the 
violence”.
182
 This quote supports the claim that the religious objective that the Wahhabis 
intended to carry out through the Chechen conflict would be overlooked by Chechen members 
since they were driven by personal reasons rather than the Islamic jihad cause to fight the 
Russians. It also presents another idea that suicide bombing isn’t always committed by the 
driving mechanism of religion. There were also positive correlations between the endorsement 
for revenge and increasing levels of religiosity, aggression, suspiciousness, and negativism.
183
 
This study also demonstrated the strong role that other psychological factors such as emotions 
and the personal state of mind played for Chechen women when transitioning into the Black 
Widows. 
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Psychological Impact – Victims of Rape, Isolation, and Trauma 
Rape was used as a violent tool during the Chechen wars and influenced Chechen women to 
become Black Widows. Zhirkova claims that Chechen women were kidnapped and raped by 
Russian soldiers during detention and as part of the campaign to ethnically cleanse certain 
areas.
184
 Even same-side rapes were committed and occasionally videotaped to make it 
impossible for the victims to return to their families, thus making martyrdom the only attractive 
solution.
185
 If a woman is raped and it is filmed, she can be blackmailed into doing anything 
because it is regarded as a dishonor to her entire family.
186
  This shows that a strong correlation 
between rape and martyrdom existed, causing Chechen women to become involved in terrorism 
as a result of being victimized and seeking to restore their honor. This correlation also supports 
the alternate explanation that victimized females became Black Widows by personal motives, not 
because of the plight of Chechen independence. Speckhard and Akhmedova observe that many 
Russian journalists reported how Chechen women were kidnapped, raped, and/or drugged in 
order to take part in terror activities, yet they did not discover any evidence that proved this.
187
 
This demonstrates how the Russian media sought to control the narrative of female members 
within Chechen insurgent groups as a means to prevent Russians from questioning its’ policy 
stance over Chechnya’s independence. The prevalence of Russian propaganda plays a key role in 
distorting the role of Chechen female terrorists as victims of violence, not as insurgents for state 
independence.   
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The depiction of all Chechen women being victims of rape during the Chechen wars has 
raised some questions in regards to whether or not this influenced their decision to become 
suicide bombers. Although there are many documented cases of Russian soldiers raping Chechen 
women and Russian media assert that Chechen women were coerced through rape into 
committing suicide attacks, there is no direct evidence of any attackers having experienced rape 
under these circumstances.
188
 O’Rourke’s analysis supports the idea that the role of rape during 
the Chechen wars has yet to be seen as the most likely root cause for Chechen women joining the 
insurgent movement. It also illustrates how discussing rape experiences may be somewhat 
considered taboo within Chechen society, yet no scholar or journalist presented within this paper 
appears to discuss this social aspect of Chechen culture.  Murphy also states that she has not 
found any evidence of a Chechen woman becoming a suicide terrorist because she or any 
member of her family or friends had been raped by Russian soldiers.
189
 Furthermore, none of the 
suicide bombers captured alive said they planned to kill themselves because they had been raped 
by Russian soldiers.
190
 This contradicts some claims made on how rape played a role in 
prompting Chechen women to engage with Chechen insurgents to serve as suicide bombers. It 
also verifies the strongest argument that present revenge and trauma as being the main motives 
for Chechen women to engage in terrorism willingly.  
Specific psychological traits like isolation and trauma are considered huge causes for the 
formation of Black Widows. According to another study conducted among Chechen female 
suicide bombers, seventy-three percent experienced depression, ninety-two percent experienced 
social alienation and isolation, twenty-three percent experienced aggression, and thirty-one 
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percent experienced a strong desire for revenge.
191
 Although revenge still remained a minor role, 
the prevalence of depression and social alienation proved to be a toxic combination for female 
victims to be attracted to terrorism as a way to take control of their lives.  This study also reveals 
that most Chechen women were in the ideal psychological condition to be easily targeted and 
recruited to complete suicide bombing missions. Bodansky observes how some European 
sociologists and psychologists were somewhat biased when studying the Black Widows by 
stating that they were driven by despair due to extreme violence toward their families and the 
isolation that left them deprived of any perspective or alternative.
192
 As a result of this isolation, 
Chechen women felt vulnerable and sought another mode of support through participating in the 
Chechen separatist cause.  
 The Chechen wars created an oppressive environment that caused most traumatized 
Chechens to fight back. Speckhard and Akhmedova conducted several interviews from an 
eclectic mix of participants (hostages, Black Widows members, close associates, and family 
members of Black Widows) and discovered that all participants experienced deep personal 
traumatization, symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, and dissociative phenomena.
193
 
Thus, psychological traumatization is considered the most plausible factor that drew Chechen 
women to become suicide bombers.
194
 The trauma that women experienced during both Chechen 
wars prompted them to pursue Chechen insurgency as a chance to become empowered again and 
feel some form of community due to the lack of kinship that they were suffering from. 
Speckhard and Akhmedova believe that the vital variables that led to Chechen women to become 
                                                          
191
Anne Speckhard & Khapta Akhmedova, Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality? ed. Yoram Schweitzer. (Tel 
Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2006), 67. 
192
 Yossef Bodansky, Chechen Jihad (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 258. 
193
 Anne Speckhard & Khapta Akhmedova, Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality? ed. Yoram Schweitzer. (Tel 





suicide bombers were through access to a terrorist group ready to equip women on suicide 
missions and the exposure to a militant jihadist ideology that resonates with the woman’s 
psychological needs.
195
 Like revenge, both isolation and trauma prove to be very powerful 
factors in leading Chechen women to become terrorists. It also exposes the Chechen insurgency 
as a neglectful non-state actor for not giving Chechen women the proper assistance needed to 
overcome their grief and mental troubles. 
Coercive Measures – Brainwashing and Zombification  
Another perspective that challenges the notion that the Black Widows chose to engage in 
terrorism out of their own free will is the procedure of zombification. This process suggests that 
Black Widows were coerced into becoming terrorists, and really had no choice but to accept it. A 
Moscow journalist named Svetlana Makunina supported the commonly held Russian view that 
the women terrorists had all been turned into zombies because they were coerced by being raped, 
drugged, or succumbed to other forceful methods.
196
 The supposed lack of unity within the 
Chechen population can be viewed as a useful tool in showing the public how the chaos within 
the Chechen region is due to the lack of cooperation with each other, not with Russia. Another 
prominent journalist named Anna Politkovskaya believed that a major motive for the women was 
to avenge the deaths of their family members since they were “zombified” by sorrow and 
grief.
197
 The effect of zombification is presented and emphasized within the Russian media in 
order to point out that Chechen women were not in a stable mindset when they decided to 
become suicide bombers. This presents how psychological factors such as trauma can cause its 
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victims to experience mental damage and under high risk of committing violent acts without 
guidance and a healthy mindset.  
Coercive methods such as drugging and brainwashing are seen as useful tactics for 
coercing female victims to become suicide bombers.  Journalist Maria Zhirkova believes many 
of the women involved are brainwashed by “zombification – there are various ways of drugging 
them or enslaving them so they don’t know what they’re doing… it is very difficult for anyone to 
understand the low position Chechen women hold in their society”.
198
 The evidence within 
Russian propaganda shows that journalists are going out of their way to portray Chechen female 
terrorists in a negative light to point out that Chechen separatist demands are unstable and 
unaccounted for. However, using this form of narrative may backlash – it could definitely raise 
awareness of the Chechen cause and instead stir sympathy from the public to support Chechen 
secession. This also assists in viewing the Black Widows less as perpetrators and more likely to 
be seen somewhat as emancipators, since the demand of Chechnya’s independence gives it 
ample justification. Murphy also mentions how Chechen insurgent groups were skilled at 
brainwashing by injecting women with drugs and successfully convincing them to believe that 
dying for Allah would rectify all their mistakes and be considered a great honor, yet no evidence 
supports this claim.
199
 While some Black Widows did commit suicide to serve God, religion 
doesn’t seem to be the strongest propensity when evaluating how Black Widows became 
effective terrorist actors. 
The coercive measures of brainwashing and zombification as the root basis of female 
terrorism for Chechen solidarity are controversial amongst scholars. Groskop gives a different 
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account of how a few Black Widows were coerced into becoming suicide bombers. She 
interviews a woman named Zarema Muzhakhoyeva, who had debts so great that a group of men 
that she took a loan from told her she had no choice but to pay them back with her life by 
completing a suicide mission.
200
 This example reveals that not all female recruits had the 
freedom and right to choose in joining the Chechen insurgent cause. Far from being freedom 
fighters with an equal right to die for their beliefs, Chechnya’s female martyrs are more likely to 
be forced, blackmailed, or brainwashed to their deaths.
201
 This goes against the notion that 
Chechen women are somewhat egalitarian and have the freedom to pursue whatever path to 
support Chechen independence. The kidnappings committed by federal forces and the horror of 
zachistkas (raids led by Russian allied paramilitary forces to apprehend and execute supporters 
of Chechen independence) are to blame for the suicide bombings.
202
 Murphy also mentions how 
the brutality of the Russian assault and the mopping-up operations “pushed Chechen women 
over the edge”.
203
 This proves that Russian intervention produced an oppressive force that caused 
Chechen women to rebel. Their actions indicate that no brainwashing or zombification methods 
were needed to induce Chechen women to join the insurgency. The findings that both Murphy 
and Groskop present prove that there are conflicting issues in regards to getting their facts 
straight about the true and underlying motivational factors of Chechen women engaging in 
terrorism. 
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Role of Nationalism 
Nationalism is another strong component that encouraged Chechen women to become 
suicide bombers. Although the Chechen insurgency was struggling to balance the goals of both 
domestic Chechen terrorists and international Wahhabi jihadists, its high level of female activity 
was solely focused on the cause for Chechen separatism.
204
 This embodied the hope and 
optimism that Chechen female terrorists felt in fighting for a just cause through committing 
violent acts. A female shahida (martyr) summed up the reasons for the Black Widows’ 
willingness to sacrifice themselves – people were unaware of the innocent people dying in 
Chechnya and “therefore, we have chosen this approach... if we die, others will come and follow 
us— our brothers and sisters who are willing to sacrifice their lives, in Allah’s way, to liberate 
the nation”.
205
 To die in hope of raising awareness and receiving more support for the Chechen 
separatist demand seemed to be a worthy deed that Black Widows were willing to commit in the 
name of independence. This also supports Speckhard and Akhmedova’s view that Chechen 
women have carried out acts of suicide terrorism from the beginning of this struggle to gain 
independence from Russia.
206
  Moreover, this verifies that nationalism proves to be a motive as 
significant as revenge and trauma for Black Widows to join the Chechen insurgents for the sake 
of seceding from Russia and have Chechnya become a liberated nation. This specific component 
also promotes an attractive feature for non-state actors to gain more adherents to their cause.  
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Improving Gender Role 
While examining the reasons why women participated in the Chechen independence 
movement, a fascinating motive presents itself – the improvement of their gender status.  By 
recruiting more females, terrorist organizations benefit from increasing their membership and 
having some form of advantage over their adversary based on the biased perception of gender.
207
 
Participation in terrorist acts affords Chechen women the chance to challenge the status quo of 
their gender norms and demonstrate that they are just as capable as men in carrying out 
terrorism. The domestic objective of the Chechen terrorist movement drew women to mobilize 
and participate at the highest levels of combat, leadership, and policymaking because they 
anticipated the elimination of repression against Chechnya and Chechen women’s 
disadvantageous position in society.
208
 This can be explained by the patriarchal system that 
governs Chechen society. Greater responsibilities within the Chechen insurgent movement gave 
Chechen women the platform to break away from their constrained gender roles. 
It is no surprise that the Black Widows would also seek to accomplish objectives of their own 
such as having egalitarian status with men after having proved their devotion to the nationalist 
cause. Bloom also points out how women want to become suicide bombers not just in the name 
of their country, religion and/or leader, but also in the name of their gender.
209
 Participating in 
terrorist actions may assist in their effort to get the recognition needed in order for them to have 
improved gender relations within Chechen society. Speckhard and Akhmedova detect that 
Chechen women are more likely to embrace the role of suicide terrorist because the roles of 
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being an active combatant are less available for them.
210
 This indicates that Chechen insurgents 
recognized that women served better as suicide bombers since it provoked a bigger reaction from 
the public, efficiently promoting their separatist cause. More research is needed for the further 
examination as to how much did the perceived idea of improving the rights of women led many 
Chechen women to join the insurgent movement. 
c. Comparative Analysis of Female Perspectives for Joining Colombian and Chechen 
Insurgencies 
The Colombian and Chechen insurgencies had different approaches in using female members 
to their benefit. Whereas the Chechen separatist movement was initially hesitant in recruiting 
female insurgents, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia were determined to reach 
out and increase female membership within their guerrilla forces. However, both insurgencies 
hold the same stance that including female members produced greater outcomes in getting 
attention and promoting the objectives of the insurgent activities. The Chechen insurgent group 
really did not give female insurgents a variety of duties outside of suicide bombing missions. No 
other research has been presented to determine if using female insurgents for suicide bombings 
causes a positive or negative perspective for Chechen female civilians. FARC guerrilleras had 
more responsibilities and further inclusion in running insurgent operations in Colombia. This is 
what caused some of them to become role models for young Colombian females. There were no 
instances of any sort of role model that influenced Chechen women in their decision to become 
suicide bombers. This illustrates that non-state actors have a strong impact in assigning new 
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gender roles for women. It also serves as a challenging reminder for state actors as to how to deal 
with women taking combative positions. 
The majority of Chechen Black Widows were mature women while FARC guerrilleras 
included teenagers as young as thirteen. No research has shown that the Chechen insurgency was 
using female teenagers in becoming suicide bombers. It can be argued that the Chechen 
insurgency were somewhat more considerate by picking and allowing members that were adults. 
At the same time, FARC guerrilleras admit to fleeing to the insurgency as a means to escape 
from abusive homes. The Chechen insurgency served more as an outlet for women to cope with 
their grief and get revenge for the death of loved ones. Both Chechen and Colombian combatants 
used the insurgency in order to fight against some form of oppression. The Black Widows and 
guerrilleras challenged the status quo of women, thus causing a strong outcry by the public since 
they transitioned themselves into strong combatants. The Russian media sought to portray the 
Black Widows in a negative light in order to prevent the Chechen insurgency from receiving 
support. Although the Colombian media portrays FARC guerrilleras with a negative lens, their 
strong presence within the insurgency was acknowledged. Both Chechen and Colombian women 
experienced marginalization against main state actors that were implementing policies and 
operations detrimental to their way of life. Both groups are also similar in the fact that they grew 
up in a masculine culture that created unequal gender roles towards women. 
The difference between the Black Widows and guerrilleras was that they fought for different 
insurgent causes. Chechen insurgency was mainly focused on independence from Russia, while 
FARC insurgency focused on fighting for social justice and state reform. Gender equality was a 
huge decision factor for Colombian women to become combatants. This presents a huge paradox 
since FARC has been classified as a terrorist group and research shows they have not lived up to 
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their egalitarian promises. This was not the case for Chechen women, indicating that not all 
insurgent groups prioritize and pursue the same objectives. Religious ideology and nationalism 
were not prevalent motives for Colombian women to participate in the FARC insurgency. The 
lack of educational and socioeconomic prospects created a difficult plight for Colombian women 
to overcome, yet Chechen women did not experience this. This suggests that Chechen female 
insurgents were mainly focused on accomplishing Chechen statehood. All facts indicate that 
despite the different agendas set by these insurgencies, the Black Widows and FARC guerrilleras 
were unquestionably committed to fighting for their causes. 
Both Chechen and Colombian female insurgents were victimized by perpetrators (state 
actors) that sought to eradicate non-state activities that threatened state control. Both groups are 
alike in that women had some exposure to these insurgencies through personal ties by relatives 
that had some affiliation with or were already insurgents themselves. Revenge was one of the 
prevalent motives for Chechen women to become suicide bombers than for Colombian 
guerrilleras. Furthermore, additional research is needed to establish if Colombian female 
combatants ever experienced isolation or were psychologically traumatized by these crimes. 
Sexual violence has shown up as one of the major occurrences for both Chechen and Colombian 
females that sought some form of justice through their insurgencies. Another similarity shared 
between Chechen and Colombian insurgencies is that they both forced some women to be a part 
of their operations. This challenges the notion that insurgencies were viewed as a safe place 
where females could receive protection. It also puts both Chechen and Colombian insurgencies 





The civil conflicts that arose within Chechnya and Colombia demonstrate the failure of two 
state actors that ignored the needs of the citizens they governed. Both Chechens and Colombians 
succumbed to a turbulent environment of political violence, leading to many casualties. The only 
way to fight back against armed groups supported by state actors was through the rise of 
insurgent groups. Chechens sought independence from Russia and Colombians sought an 
alternative measure of governance away from the corrupt Colombian government. Both of these 
insurgencies elucidate why non-state actors can gain popularity and power amongst any 
oppressed population. The Black Widows and FARC guerrilleras were victimized by the civil 
conflicts and therefore sought to join insurgencies as a way to gain some form of redemption or 
empowerment. Chechen and Colombian insurgents were willing to engage in lethal violent acts 
for the sake of defending their insurgent cause. This shows that despite the terrorist label that 
these insurgencies were given, they still could be perceived as a beneficial haven for women.  
  The motives that still caused female civilians to become suicide bombers in Chechnya 
and rebel combatants in Colombia reveal the consequences of main state actors treating female 
civilians as insignificant. Ironically, despite the fact that the efforts of these women produced a 
good outcome for the insurgent groups they joined, non-state actors continued to treat them as 
insignificant within their ranks. My argument is supported by the Chechen Black Widows in that 
the Chechen insurgency only saw them as successful in carrying out suicide missions, but never 
acknowledged the fight for their rights as women. However, the FARC challenges my argument 
as it highly prioritized gender equality within its agenda. Yet there is evidence that FARC also 
disregards the plight of women as it sometimes uses coercive measures that violate a woman’s 
freedom. Despite existing in different parts of the world, the Colombian and Chechen 
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insurgencies display why and how non-state actors can become powerful. Their similarities also 
explain why both state-led and non-state armed groups fail to set a better stance in their treatment 
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